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A B S T R A C T
Humans often make inﬂated or erroneous estimates of their own ability or performance. Such errors in
calibration can be due to incomplete processing, neglect of available information or due to improper
weighing or integration of the information and can impact our decision-making, risk tolerance, and
behaviors. In the driving context, these outcomes can have important implications for safety. The current
paper discusses the notion of calibration in the context of self-appraisals and self-competence as well as
in models of self-regulation in driving. We further develop a conceptual framework for calibration in the
driving context borrowing from earlier models of momentary demand regulation, information
processing, and lens models for information selection and utilization. Finally, using the model we
describe the implications for calibration (or, more speciﬁcally, errors in calibration) for our
understanding of driver distraction, in-vehicle automation and autonomous vehicles, and the training
of novice and inexperienced drivers.
ã 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
As hungry processors of information, we humans selectively
attend to environmental cues and render judgments concerning
the state of the world around us. At the same time and with some
degree of introspection, we carry out self-appraisals, evaluating
how skillful or capable we are in different contexts. Both the
manner inwhich we perceive theworld, as well as our perceptions
of our own effectiveness as agents in the world, can have a
tremendous bearing on the decisions we make, the behaviors we
engage in, and the risks we entertain. While these perceptions of
world and self often lead to reasonable decisions and behaviors as
well as tolerable levels of risk, the more profound interest emerges
in situations where the subjective perception of the world or of
self deviates from objective reality, with potentially negative
consequences. For example, a driver, thinking that current driving
conditions are easy, sends a text message—having failed to notice a
nearby hazard; the driver with a highly reliable automated system
comes to distrust and disuse it for what the driver wrongly
considers to be too many false alarms; the novice driver,
overconﬁdent in their driving skills and abilities, travels at a high
speed on a slippery surface.
Gaps between perception and reality can be related to
the notion of calibration, which itself can be broadly deﬁned as
the determination of the accuracy of an instrument by measure-
ment of its variation from a standard. Despite having a strong
foundation in the physical sciences, calibration is not unique to this
context. The concept of calibration also has prominence in the
social and psychological sciences—often in situations where one’s
ability to make sufﬁciently accurate judgments to guide decision-
making and behavior is paramount. Indeed, calibration has been
widely discussed in a variety of domains, including weather
forecasting, education, scholastic aptitude, medicine, work and
management, eye witness testimony, as well as driving. Within
these ﬁelds, some researchers have focused on whether or not
individuals’ perceptions are in (or out of) alignment with an
objective standard while others have focused on managing task
demands and user capabilities as a means of bringing two
measurements or estimates into alignment (e.g., Kuiken and
Twisk, 2001; Fuller, 2005; Mitsopoulos-Rubens, 2010).
In the current paper,wediscuss calibrationas it relates to general
self-appraisals and evaluations of one’s competence in making
perceptual judgments (thestateofcalibration)aswellastomodelsof
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 508 497 0237; fax: +1 508 435 0482.
E-mail addresses: william.horrey@libertymutual.com (W.J. Horrey),
mary.lesch@libertymutual.com (M.F. Lesch),
eve.mitsopoulosrubens@roads.vic.gov.au (E. Mitsopoulos-Rubens),
jdlee@engr.wisc.edu (J.D. Lee).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2014.12.017
0001-4575/ã 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Accident Analysis and Prevention 76 (2015) 25–33
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Accident Analysis and Prevention
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/ locate /aap
self-regulation in driving (which are concerned with the process of
bringing subjective and objective measures into alignment). We
further propose a framework for calibration in the driving context,
building and elaborating upon some earlier models of momentary
demand regulation (e.g., Fuller, 2005; Mitsopoulos-Rubens, 2010),
models of information processing (e.g., Wickens and Hollands,
2000), and lens models for information selection and utilization
(e.g., Brunswik, 1955; Hammond,1955). We illustrate how different
components in the model can account for some of the errors and
deﬁciencies in calibration observed in the literature and, in so doing,
overcome possible shortcomings in some previous models of
calibration in driving. Finally, we describe the practical implications
of calibration for road safety through three examples: our
understanding of driver distraction, in-vehicle automation and
autonomous vehicles, and the training of inexperienced drivers. It is
hoped that the framework will provide guidance to research efforts
concerning the role of calibration in the study of road safety; help
account for discrepancies between perception, performance and
skill; and lead to approaches aimedatmitigatingpotentially adverse
effects of miscalibration.
2. Calibration failures
Errors in calibration have important implications for safety and
performance and can be due to deﬁciencies in the processing of
available information, errors in evaluated self-competence and/or
comparison errors. The failure to process, or appropriately weigh,
highly critical information can result in a slanted, narrow, or
erroneous awareness of the situation (e.g., Grifﬁn and Tversky,
1992). Similarly, an unrealistic appraisal of our own skills
and abilities—while promoting good feelings of self-worth and
esteem—can also place us in situations that we are ill-equipped to
deal with.
Evidence from various domains suggests that individuals’
subjective impressions or evaluations are not well-calibrated to
more objective measures. People generally tend to view them-
selves in favorable or optimistic terms—regardless of the degree of
truth in the assertion (e.g., Brown, 1986; DeJoy, 1989; Dunning
et al., 2004). This tendency has been couched in many different
terms, such as optimism bias, self-enhancement bias, illusory
superiority, amongmany others (e.g., Sharot, 2011; Hoorens,1993).
Studies of self-efﬁcacy, self-appraisal, self-conﬁdence, and other
forms of self-evaluation are widespread in the social and
psychological scientiﬁc literature. Indeed, there is such a plethora
of work in this area that it can even support meta-syntheses of
dozens of meta-analyses (e.g., Zell and Krizan, 2014). Findings of
enhanced self-appraisals are evident in almost every discipline,
including education and learning (e.g., Bol and Hacker, 2012),
ethics (e.g., Baumhart, 1968), health and medicine (e.g., Larwood,
1978; Weinstein, 1980; Dunning et al., 2004) and workplace and
managerial skills (e.g., Larwood and Whittaker, 1977). This is also
the case for self-appraisals with respect to driving skills and
abilities. Many studies have documented drivers’ tendency to rate
themselves more favorably than other drivers or to rate their skills
as better than indicated by some objective standard (e.g., Svenson,
1981; McKenna et al., 1991; DeJoy,1989; Brown and Groeger, 1988;
Horswill et al., 2004).1
Errors in calibration have also been widely documented in
decision-making and judgment paradigms, particularly where
uncertainty is a critical element. Calibration, in this framework, is
often characterized mathematically as the correspondence
between one’s conﬁdence in a judgment (degree of certainty)
and the accuracy of the judgment (e.g., Murphy, 1973; Lichtenstein
and Fischhoff,1977; Lichtenstein et al.,1982; Baranski and Petrusic,
1994, 1995; Soll, 1996).
Dunning et al. (2004) reviewed evidence for imprecise or
ﬂawed self-assessments, citing poor correlations between self-
ratings of skill and actual performance as well as the tendency for
people to overrate themselves (placing themselves as better than
average)—outcomes echoed by many (e.g., Zell and Krizan, 2014;
Mabe andWest,1982). These latter ratings are sometimesmanifest
as overestimates in their engagement in desirable behaviors or in
their achievement of favorable outcomes, overly optimistic
estimates of future productivity, and over-conﬁdence in judg-
ments. Dunning et al. (2004) further suggested that these errors in
calibration can result from incomplete information, on the one
hand, and neglect of relevant information, on the other (i.e., in the
diligent processing and appropriate weighing of information).
Errors can likewise result from incomplete or inadequate
processing of available information (through heuristics or selec-
tion), biases or other top-down inﬂuences (e.g., Slovic et al., 1977;
Kahneman and Tversky, 1972).
As hinted in Section 1, our own self-appraisals and evaluations
can affect howwe interact with the world. Yet many studies do not
examine the roles of action or feedback in such evaluations
(cf., Simons, 2013; Stone and Opel, 2000). The next section
describes how the process of bringing different measures or
estimates into alignment has been implemented in models of
driving behavior. While “state” errors in calibration of self-
evaluation and ability, such as those described above, are inherent
to these models, the focus is on the process of appraisal and action
regulation (i.e., self-regulation or momentary demand regulation;
e.g., Kuiken and Twisk, 2001). Given the dynamic and self-paced
nature of driving as well as the lack of a clear gold standard for
driving safety/performance, one could argue that the regulatory
process is more germane in the driving context than general
appraisals of self and skill (although both are important).
2.1. Theories of demand regulation in driving
Several models of driver behavior treat calibration as a
regulatory process in which the driver balances the momentary
assessment of ability and the assessment of demand. For example,
the task-capability interface model (Fuller, 2005) posits that
drivers will adopt a preferred level of driving difﬁculty. Whenever
task difﬁculty exceeds the preferred range, drivers will make
behavioral adjustments to return difﬁculty to the desired range.
Difﬁculty is a property that emerges from the interaction between
driving demands and driver capacity (see similarmodels described
byDavidse et al., 2010; de Craen, 2010;Mitsopoulos-Rubens, 2010).
Driving demands are determined in part by speed, road,
environment, and other driving properties. Driver capabilities
(i.e., capacity) are determined bymany factors including biological
factors, knowledge, skills, and allocation of resources. The “ﬁt”
between driver demands and capabilities contributes to the
perceived difﬁculty of the tasks.
Safe or successful performance is therefore contingent upon the
ability of drivers to recognize the relationship between demands of
the driving task and their own capabilities. When demands of the
driving task exceed a driver’s capabilities, the well-calibrated
driver will recognize this difﬁculty and take measures to bring the
two into alignment. For example, by reducing speed, a driver may
ease the time pressure and challenges of vehicle control associated
with a curvy stretch of road. Drivers that are not well-calibrated
might fail to take protective countermeasures thereby placing
themselves at risk (e.g., Deery, 1999; Spolander, 1983).
1 We do note that, here and elsewhere, these studies often deﬁne or contrast
between overconﬁdence, overestimates or over-placement in different ways. A fair
and cogent treatment of these issues, however, is beyond the intended scope of the
current effort.
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While these models (Fuller, 2005; de Craen, 2010;
Mitsopoulos-Rubens, 2010) share common features with respect
to demand regulation, they differ in terms of the underlying
constructs and driving factors. For example, de Craen (2010) views
calibration as a deliberative process that is driven by motivational
factors. In contrast, Mitsopoulos-Rubens considers calibration as a
metacognitive process, one that is grounded in information
processing. Furthermore, Mitsopoulos-Rubens (2010) underscores
the importance of feedback in inﬂuencing knowledge of task
demands and knowledge of capabilities at both a local, speciﬁc
level and at a more global level. That is, feedback can update and
reﬁne the immediate processing of current information and action
selection (local level), but can also inform more distal and general
appraisals of self and competence (global level), as described
earlier.
Since models of calibration require appraisals of task demands
as well as driver capabilities and comparisons between the two, it
follows that errors in calibration can arise from over- or
underestimation in both or either of these constructs and/or from
failures in the comparatormechanism. Obviously, underestimating
task demands and overestimating capabilities carries the strongest
implications for safety. A clear and accurate appraisal of task
demands calls for an accurate perception of the state of the world
and current performance whereas the realistic appraisal of
capabilities relies on accurate knowledge of self, generally-
speaking, as well as in situ.
While thesemodels of demand regulation offer averyusefulway
of conceptualizing appraisals of situational factors and perceived
capabilities as well as the resulting behavioral modiﬁcation, they
tend to offer a rather high level view of the relevant constructs. The
mechanisms, although implied in many of the models, are not
necessarily explicitly stated and the models are sometimes silent
with respect to themany factors that can impact self and situational
appraisals (and this isnot to suggest that the authorsof thesemodels
are unaware of these factors). In the following section,we propose a
framework for calibration in the driving context that expands on
these earlier models of momentary demand regulation by integrat-
ing aspects of human information processing (e.g., Wickens and
Hollands, 2000) and lens models for information selection and
utilization ( Brunswik, 1955; Hammond, 1955). We believe that the
inclusion of these other components offers aworthwhile expansion
of the conceptual space andallows for amore pointed explorationof
calibration and its role in road safety. For example, the inclusion of
the information processing model allows one to drill deeper into
cognitive processes that encompass perception and action in the
world, highlighting the important role of attention in regulating the
ﬂow of information. The emphasis on attention in the model also
allows for a more expansive discussion of internal and external
factors that can impact its availability. Although prominent in other
disciplines, the lensmodelhasreceivedlittle treatmentinthedriving
domain even though it offers an effective conceptualization and
quantiﬁcation of information processing.
3. Framework development
It is because we are limited in our capacity, that we cannot
process all available information and the information we do
process is selective and subject to top-down as well as bottom-up
inﬂuences. Many models of selective attention and eye scanning
describe how we select speciﬁc visual information (e.g., Senders,
1983; Moray, 1986; Itti and Koch, 2000; Bundesen, 1990) and,
oftentimes, we engage in shortcuts or heuristics in order to
preserve cognitive resources (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1972;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Slovic et al., 1977, 1979; Todd and
Gigerenzer, 2003). It follows that a useful framework should
incorporate a mechanism through which different information
cues are selectively attended to, and weighed, in rendering
appraisals or judgments. Lens models offer one such approach.
3.1. Lens model: selection and utilization of information
The lens model is a useful technique for exploring the nature
and the quality of an observer’s assessment of the world compared
to the actual state of the world. The original lens model
characterized observer perception (Brunswik, 1955); however, it
was elaborated by Hammond (1955) in the context of judgment
and decision making. At its core, the lens model describes how
people use different information cues to make a judgment
concerning the state of the world. The manner in which humans
selectively weigh the information available to them (including, in
some cases, a complete disregard of certain information) impacts
the accuracy of their perception.
A simple lens model is shown in Fig. 1. The state of the world
(SOW) is characterized as the environmental criterion variable (YE)
and indices or proximal cues (X1,X2, . . . , Xn) provide information
regarding the environmental criterion. The strength of the
correlation between the cues and the criterion variable is a
reﬂection of the ecological validity of each cue (wE1,wE2, . . . ,wEn).
On the right hand side of the ﬁgure is the subjective judgment (YJ),
where the observer weighs the various information cues (i.e., cue
utilization policy) and renders a judgment or assessment of SOW.
In practice, human judges might not weigh the information cues
according to their informativeness of the true SOW and
therefore the subjective judgment is only an approximation of
the true SOW. The observer could also fall into a trap of
overemphasizing or disregarding particular cues, relative to their
utility (e.g., wS1 6¼wE1). This could lead to very disparate estimates
of the world. That is, as suggested by Dunning et al. (2004), errors
in calibration can arise from incomplete processing or inappropri-
ate use/weighing, as well as outright neglect, of available
information in rendering a judgment. In this sense, the cue
utilization strategy or policy employed by the observer can be
likened to various heuristics used in theories of human judgment
and decision making (e.g., Simon, 1956; Tversky and Kahneman,
1974; Ölander, 1975; Todd and Gigerenzer, 2003). These heuristics
offer potential shortcuts for preserving cognitive resources,
representing a more deliberate strategy for limiting the informa-
tion that is processed.
The lens model can be readily quantiﬁed and distilled into a
number of important metrics concerning the accuracy of an
[(Fig._1)TD$FIG]
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the lens model. Shown are various information
cues (Xn), the weighting of these cues (w) both by the observer (S) and in relation to
the environmental criterion (E). Achievement (ra) reﬂects the degree of
correspondence between the judgment and the environmental criterion (i.e., the
accuracy of the judgment). After Goldstein (2006).
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observer’s judgment as well as some of their underlying biases and
has been applied in a wide range of domains, including the
assessment of diagnostic skills of physicians, weather forecasters,
auditors, pilots, air trafﬁc controllers, and many others
(e.g., Murphy, 1988; Cooksey, 1996; Stewart, 1990; Kirlik, 2006;
Hammond and Stewart, 2001).
3.2. Driver calibration framework
Our conceptual framework is shown in Fig. 2. The lower half of
the ﬁgure captures themomentary appraisal of theworld aswell as
the driver’s subsequent response and action. On the lower left, a
lens model characterizes the manner in which drivers assess
SOW—in this case expressed as “current performance”, but could
also be expressed in terms of task demands or some other
environmental criterion. On the right side of the lens model, the
driver uses the information cues (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) to make a
subjective estimate of the state of the world. Elaborating on the
simple lensmodel shown in Fig.1, this process is built into amodel
of information processing (shown on the lower right; after
Wickens and Hollands, 2000) that invokes perception and various
aspects of cognition (memory and information integration) in
rendering a judgment.2 It follows that the driver’s estimate of SOW
is determined by the information that the driver selectively attends
to and by the manner in which the information is weighed and
integrated (drawing upon information stored in long term
memory). It is important to note that top-down inﬂuences are
not the sole determinants of information selection and processing;
this can also be impacted by bottom-up factors such as the salience
of information (e.g., Itti and Koch, 2000;Wickens et al., 2003). Also,
drivers’ estimates can be inﬂuenced by their perceived abilities and
skills. For example, drivers who believe they are highly competent
might have a different cue utilization policy (i.e., weighing of
information cues) that serves to reinforce this belief. Here,
calibration in judgment is deﬁned as the correspondence between
an observer’s subjective estimate of SOW and the objective
measurement of it.
Following the appraisal of SOW, drivers will select an
appropriate response and execute it—an outcome that will affect
the state of theworld (via feedback). Thus, the process of sampling,
judging, and acting upon the world is a closed-loop process.
Response selection, in this model, assumes some of the function of
the comparator component in earlier demand regulation models
(although we note that the comparator function in these other
models more often involves a direct comparison of perceived
capabilities and perceived task demands; e.g., Davidse et al., 2010;
Mitsopoulos-Rubens, 2010). That is, the response selection in the
current framework is a reﬂection of the momentary needs based
on the driver’s evaluation, but is also inﬂuenced by many global
factors, including the driver’s perceived abilities.
The individual stages that constitute the information process-
ing model are all serviced in varying degrees by attention. That is,
perceiving, integrating, deciding and acting are all effortful
processes—though not necessarily conscious, deliberative
processes—and attention is a limited resource (e.g., Kahneman,
1973; Wickens, 2002). Global factors, such as age, experience, and
domain expertise, can impact the availability of attentional
resources and, because of potential limitations, we simply might
not have the capacity to select, process, and integrate all the
[(Fig._2)TD$FIG]
Fig. 2. Framework for examining calibration in driving.
2 We adopt the information processing perspective because it offers a useful way
of conceptualizing the role of attention and other underlying cognitive and
response processes. Other models, such as Neisser’s (1976) perceptual cycle model,
could also be useful expressions of the interplay between knowledge, directed
perceptual exploration, and the actual environment.
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available, or even the most relevant, information. That is, our cue
utilization policy is inﬂuenced by the amount of information that
can be (or is) taken in at a given moment.3 Situational factors can
further restrict the availability of resources, by way of capacity
(e.g., fatigue) or competition (e.g., from the demand or structure of
other concurrent tasks). For example, as workload increases, as in
the case of elevated driving demands or competition frommultiple
tasks, theremay be fewer attentional resources available so drivers
might change their utilization policy such that they only take into
account the information cues that they consider the most relevant,
while those viewed as less informative will be neglected. By this
process, they can render a judgment that might be sufﬁcient,
although not optimal, while preserving attentional resources for
other tasks (e.g., a process sometimes referred to as satisﬁcing;
Simon, 1956; Ölander, 1975). However, in other situations, a
shortage of attentional resources can lead to misleading or false
appraisals of SOW with potentially dangerous repercussions.
In their meta-synthesis, Zell and Krizan (2014) found that
self-evaluations were worse for tasks that were less familiar or
more complex—those imposing greater demands on attention.
Additionally, and following from Lee and See (2004), affective
(emotional) processes that are context-driven can impact the
manner in which information is selected and processed.
A second lens model in the upper left of Fig. 2 shows various
information cues that guide the more general perception of skill or
ability. Similar to the appraisal of SOW, driverswill selectivelyweigh
and utilize different bits of information in making such
self-evaluations. The degree of correspondence between their
perceived abilities and their actual abilities can be referred to as
the calibrationof skill.4 AsnotedbyDunninget al. (2004), disparities
in self-appraisal can be due to incomplete or inappropriate
processing of information or by neglect of information (here a
reﬂection of the cue utilizationpolicy). Importantly, and as shown in
Fig. 2, the driver’s estimates of theworld and feedback generated by
the response execution stage can themselves become information
cues that guide the perception of one’s own ability. That is, local
estimatesofSOW(whetheraccurateornot)mightserve tomodifyor
reinforceperceivedabilitiesovertimeorwithrepeatedexposure.We
also note that the perception of ability interacts with other global
factors, such as age, experience, and personality traits (e.g., older
driversmightdeemthemselves tobe less capable than theiryounger
counterparts). Individual factors, such as intelligence, achievement,
locusof control, narcissism,and self-esteem,have alsobeen found to
be associated with the accuracy in self-appraisals (e.g., Mabe and
West, 1982; Brown, 1986; Farwell and Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998).
Paradoxically,KrugerandDunning(1999) showedthat those thatare
less skilled tend to overestimate their skillsmore than thosewhoare
more skilled (later termed the Dunning–Kruger effect). They
attribute this to differences in metacognitive ability: unskilled
individuals simply do not have the capacity or tools to assess their
own abilities effectively.
This framework conceptualizes calibration as it relates to
momentary judgmentsofSOWandtoappraisals of self-competence.
The lens models offer a useful means of illustrating how drivers
selectively attend to, and weigh, relevant information (and the
computational aspect of the lens model, described elsewhere, can
provide a useful means of quantifying the relationships; e.g.,
Cooksey, 1996). The stages of the information processing model
reﬂect the agency of drivers in the world and also highlight
the importance of attention in making local judgments. Finally, the
important roles of both situational factors (the current context) as
well asmore global factors are elucidated (thoughwe grant that the
current lists of factors are illustrative, not exhaustive). Empirical
evaluationof these andother relationshipswill allow for reﬁnement
of the framework.
One aspect of themodel merits a ﬁnal, yet important comment:
the manner by which the environmental criterion (or state of the
world) is deﬁned or measured. The state of the world cannot be
automatically known; it toomust bemeasured and tools used to do
so are imperfect and subject to misinterpretation and random
noise (even objectively-deﬁned ones). As suggested by Ackerman
et al. (2002), some of the miscalibration between self-ratings and
objective measures is due to a lack of speciﬁcity in the measures
employed. Likewise, Dunning et al. (1989) suggested that some of
the self-enhancements could be due in part to ambiguity in the
characteristic dimension (i.e., what they are asked to appraise;
e.g., trait could describe a wide variety of behaviors; echoed by
Sundström (2008) in the driving context). For example, a rating of
general driving skill could be interpreted in the context of crash
history or history of moving violations and in terms of operational
vehicle control, among many other facets. Thus, with respect to
observed errors in calibration and in the absence of more speciﬁc
guidance, people might select the most favorable criteria to make
their assessment or they might simply consider the evidence that
most readily comes to mind (availability heuristic, Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974). As noted by Zell and Krizan (2014), the gaps
between subjective and objective appraisals can be attenuated
when the domain area or measure is more speciﬁc in nature.
4. Application areas
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the importance of calibration
in a few topical areas and illustrate how the conceptual model can
help situate current research ﬁndings and guide future efforts. The
selection of these particular areas was driven by the experiences
and expertise of the authors as well as the fact that they represent
common, topical, and emerging areas in road safety.
4.1. Driver distraction
Today, drivers are able to perform more and more in-vehicle
activities as new embedded and portable devices and technologies
become increasingly available. Although new technologies may
afford drivers enhanced productivity, there are obvious safety
concerns to the extent that these devices and related activities
detract attention from the driving task. There has been a
proliferation of studies pertaining to distracted driving—one that
largely parallels the explosive growth of the devices themselves.
These studies typically examine the impact of distracted driving on
various measures of performance or other outcomes (see Regan
et al., 2009 for a review). Not surprisingly, when drivers divide
their attention between multiple tasks, their performance on one
task, or another, suffers (e.g., Caird et al., 2004; Horrey and
Wickens, 2006).
Studies have found that drivers might not be well-calibrated to
the effects of distracting activities on their performance. For
example, Lesch and Hancock (2004) found that a priori ratings of
conﬁdence in dealing with distracting tasks were not related to
actual performance while distracted. Moreover, the authors did not
ﬁnd any relationship between subjective ratings of performance or
task demands and actual performance, suggesting that somedrivers
maynotbeawareofperformancedecrementswhiledistracted. In an
extension of this work, Horrey et al. (2008) directly compared
drivers’ subjective estimates of performance while distracted with
3 This said, we do not suggest that resource limitations or attempts to conserve
attentional resources are the sole determinants of one’s cue utilization policy. The
degree of processing can be inﬂuenced by other factors as well.
4 Here we cede that there are many terms that could be used here
interchangeably; nomenclature aside, the important point is that this rating
involves a more general assessment of one’s self (similar to many of those studies
described in Section 2) as opposed to a momentary appraisal of the SOW.
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actual distraction effects, along a number of measures of driving
performance. The results from their study suggest that, for themost
part, drivers’ perceptions are not well-calibrated to the distracting
effects of a cognitively demanding in-vehicle task. Similarly, Yang
et al. (2012) found that drivers over-estimated the impact of
in-vehicle tasks on driving performance yet under-estimated the
impact on visual scanning; Crisler and Tyrrell (2011) found that
drivers failed to recognize that their responses to objects and events
weremore impaired by secondary tasks thanwere responses in lane
keeping tasks.
In the context of the framework in Fig. 2, increased task
demands in the form of concurrent activities affects the availability
of attentional resources for the various stages of information
processing. This can impact the effectiveness of response selection
and execution (ﬁndings of degraded performance), but it can also
impact the selection of relevant information, leading to poor
calibration. For example, the presence of a secondary visual task
might cause drivers to fail to process critical information because
their visual attention is directed elsewhere. Poor calibration may
also stem froma reduction in the availability ofmental resources to
effectively weigh and integrate information—that is, those
resources that would normally be used in support of situation
awareness (Wickens, 2001, 2002). Although not speciﬁc to
performance judgments, a number of studies have documented
declines in an operator’s situation awareness in the face of
heightened levels of workload (e.g., Endsley and Kaber, 1999). The
driver’s appraisal of SOW, in this case erroneous, can impact their
decision-making and response selection. Drivers may engage in
distracting activities simply because they do not realize that their
performance is degraded while distracted (i.e., they are not
sampling the appropriate information) or they may be overly
conﬁdent in their skills and their ability to deal with distractions
while behind the wheel.
4.2. In-vehicle automation and autonomous vehicles
Computerization of vehicles has begun to fundamentally
change the role of the driver. Collision warning systems and
driver assistance systems, such as adaptive cruise control,
autonomous braking, and steering assist already relieve the driver
of some of the demands of driving. In the near future, drivers may
be able to fully delegate control to the vehicle for extended periods
on certain types of roads. These increasingly automated vehicles do
not simply relieve people of various driving tasks, but they change
the nature of driving and introduce new tasks (Woods, 1996).
These new tasks and the spare capacity that these systems can
produce interact with the new information sources that can
distract drivers.
Calibration can play an important role in drivers’ understanding,
agreement, and trust in automated systems as well as the utility of
such technological innovations, particularly for systems that infer
whether drivers are impaired (e.g., distracted) or for systemswhere
driversneed tomonitor systemfunctionandtakeoverwhendeemed
necessary (e.g., level 3, NHTSA levels of automation). A discrepancy
between the driver’s and the system’s estimates of the state of the
world could result in operator-system conﬂicts, reduced trust in the
system and, ultimately, system disuse (Lee and See 2004; Lee and
Moray, 1994; Parasuraman and Riley, 1997).
In Fig. 3 a new component is added on the left hand side,
representing some form of in-vehicle automation. Presumably, the
automationwill be monitoring the state of theworld, concurrently
with the “driver” and the information cues may or may not be the
same as those used by drivers. The automated system, particularly
those that afford active vehicle control, can also impact the state of
the world directly. Moreover, the automation itself might become
an information cue that drivers use in their own appraisal of SOW
(whether by direct or indirect feedback). Some systems, such as
those that employ learning algorithms might also be informed by
the systems knowledge of the driver’s abilities. In Fig. 3, the
calibration of the automation is also relevant; as with human
judges, the automation can alsomake erroneous estimates of SOW.
Equally important—especially in the context of system trust—is the
correspondence between the automation’s and driver’s appraisals
of SOW. If they are compatible, the driver is more likely to use the
system; however, if they are very divergent, issues and conﬂicts are
certain to arise.
[(Fig._3)TD$FIG]
Fig. 3. Framework for examining calibration in driving, expanded to show the role and inﬂuence of automation (on the left hand side of the ﬁgure).
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4.3. Inexperienced drivers
The notion of calibration is often implicated in discussions
of inexperienced (typically younger) drivers. Indeed, some of the
demand regulation models described earlier emerged from
extensive work on inexperienced drivers and explorations into
howerrors in calibration can lead to inappropriate and unsafe road
behaviors (cf., Mitsopoulos-Rubens, 2010; de Craen, 2010).
Several studies have shown that novice drivers tend to overesti-
mate their driving skills more so than experienced drivers
(de Craen et al., 2011; Horswill et al., 2004) and others have
found that such errors in calibration can lead to aggressive driving
(Spolander, 1983). Some of the concerns over young and
inexperienced drivers become more complex when one considers
other potential confounding factors in their driving behaviors,
such as their propensity towards potentially distracting
technology (Lee, 2007).
Following from the framework shown in Fig. 2, it is clear that
age and experience can impact a driver's perception of their own
skills as well as the momentary appraisal of the state of the world.
For example, an inexperienced driver might have unrealistic
estimates of skill simply because they have not encountered
sufﬁcient driving situations with the appropriate degree of
feedback (which feeds into their general appraisal of skill).
Experience can thus inﬂuence how information regarding general
skill is weighed and interpreted. As drivers gain more driving
experience, they are also able to automatize some aspects of the
driving task (e.g., Ranney, 1994), thus freeing up additional
resources that might be used in support of the momentary
assessment of the state of the world.
Given the importance of feedback in the framework—and in
training, more generally—it follows that training can have
important repercussions for both the development of actual skills
as well as drivers’ perceptions of these skills. Paradoxically, earlier
work in driver training found that the training of different skills,
such as skid control, actually led to worse safety outcomes
(e.g., Elvik et al., 2009). Mayhew and Simpson (2002) cited
overconﬁdence from the training course, coupled with poor
retention of skills, as major determinants. Based in part on these
outcomes, some individuals and agencies advocate training
approaches that improve calibration skills such that drivers do
not underestimate driving risks and overestimate their skills
(e.g., Kuiken and Twisk, 2001; IRF, 2014). Gregersen (1996) nicely
demonstrated that an “insight training” approach—one where
drivers received direct experience and insight into their own
limitations—could offset some of the undesirable patterns of
overconﬁdence exhibited in a group that received skill-based
training (see also Brookhuis et al., 2011; in the context of alcohol
impairment). An insight approach (and other similar approaches)
is consistent with the framework in Fig. 2, showing that feedback
derived from actual experience or exposure can be used to update
or reinforce general appraisals of skill and can also percolate to
momentary appraisals of the world. In some ways, insight training
can also provide more opportunities for pertinent feedback; in
reality, there is often very little feedback for drivers to gauge how
well they are doing—short of involvement in a crash or some other
incident or trafﬁc violation.
As a short sidebar, it is also important to note drivers at the
other end of the spectrum. Some studies have shown that older
drivers are also subject to similar errors or biases in calibration
with respect to their skills and judgment (e.g., Freund et al., 2005;
Horswill et al., 2004, 2013). However, many studies have shown
that older drivers tend to self-regulate their behavior by avoiding
certain types of driving situations such as nighttime or inclement
weather or through active avoidance of certain intersections
(e.g., Baldock et al., 2006; Molnar and Eby, 2008). Such behaviors
could reﬂect a general awareness of their own deﬁcits (i.e., good
calibration). That said, older drivers remain overrepresented in
motor vehicle crashes (e.g., Stutts et al., 2009), suggesting that
these behavioral adaptations are not always effective. Although
many factors can be implicated, the general cognitive and
perceptual declines experienced with advancing age certainly
impact the amount and degree to which information can be
effectively processed—an outcome that could lead to important
and safety-critical outcomes.
5. Conclusions
Humans often make inﬂated or erroneous estimates of their
own ability or performance. Such errors in calibration are very
important considerations in the context of road safety. The result
can be poor decision making or risky behavior. Although the
outcomes are often couched in different terminology or
constructs, there is a vast literature that has documented the
propensity for people to view themselves in favorable or
optimistic light, irrespective of their actual performance, abilities
or prospects (e.g., Zell and Krizan, 2014; Mabe and West, 1982). It
is suggested that these biases or errors can result from incomplete
or improper processing of available information (Dunning et al.,
2004). In many cases, these appraisals represent more general
estimates of self that could persist across time and different
situations. Although not independent of these enduring traits,
errors in estimates or judgments can also occur in the here and
now; that is, errors in calibration can occur in the processing and
determination of the current state of the world. Models of self-
regulation nicely articulate the need for accurate appraisals of
momentary demands, such that behavior can be adjusted
accordingly (e.g., Fuller, 2005).
Building and elaborating on earlier models of calibration
(demand regulation), we developed a framework that includes
important aspects of information processing (Wickens and
Hollands, 2000) and lens modeling (Brunswik, 1955). The former
provides a stronger treatment of some of the underlying cognitive
stages that are engaged in the selection and processing of relevant
information as well as the process of decision-making
(action selection) as well as execution. Moreover, it illustrates
the important role of attention for all of these processes and
highlights factors—both situational and global—that can impact its
availability. The lens modeling component provides a conceptual
(as well as mathematical) approach to examining how different
information in the world can be selectively weighed and used by a
human actor and allows one to contrast this cue utilization policy
against the diagnosticity of this same information. With the
proposed framework, the ﬂow of information from selection,
processing and integration to response execution not only impacts
the state of the world (calling for the cyclic processing of
information), but can also inﬂuence the more enduring
self-appraisals.
Finally, we highlight a few sample areaswhere an understanding
of calibration could shed some important insight into driver
(or operator) decision-making and behavior as well as their
performance and safety. These examples are merely illustrative
and we believe that calibration could be an integral aspect to our
understanding of human decision-making and behavior, not only in
the driving context but also in many applied and safety-critical
situations. While we acknowledge that the framework is not
exhaustive or complete, we hope that itwill be useful in articulating
and guiding research efforts concerning the role of calibration in
driving and other domains; in essence, helping account for
discrepancies between perception, performance, and skill; and
leadingtoapproachesaimedatmitigatingpotentiallyadverseeffects
of miscalibration.
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